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Note
Groundwater Rights on Public Land in California
Fifteen million acres of land in California-nearly one-sixth of the
state-have been designated as public land.' Public land, sometimes
called the "public domain," is land owned by the federal government 2
which remains open to settlement, sale, or disposition under the public
land laws.3 The Interior Department administers this land through the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) under the authority of the Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).4 Almost all of this
land is in the California Desert,5 where public uses of the land, such as
recreation, livestock grazing, and mining, often depend on the availa-
bility of water.6 One important source of water in the desert is ground-
I. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INVENTORY INFORMATION ON PUB-
LIC LANDS 10-12 (1970) (prepared for the Public Law Review Comm'n) [hereinafter cited as
COMMERCE INVENTORY].
2. Federal land is generally divided into four categories: 1) public land, 2) reserved
land, 3) withdrawn land, and 4) acquired land. See PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N,
ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO CONGRESS 19-
22 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT]. Reserved land is land that is removed from
the public domain for federal purposes. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138
(1976). Examples of reserved land are Indian reservations, national parks, and military ba-
ses. Withdrawn land is land that is removed from the public domain pending ultimate dispo-
sition. The terms "withdrawal" and "reservation" are used interchangably today. C.
WHEATLEY, STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN LANDS A-1
(1969) (prepared for the Public Land Law Review Comm'n). Acquired land is land the
United States has acquired from private owners by purchase, gift, exchange, or condemna-
tion. PLLRC REPORT, supra, at 20. This Note deals solely with issues related to water use
on public land and does not address issues related to water use on reserved, withdrawn, or
acquired land.
3. Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 601 (9th Cir.
1981).
4. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 103(e), 90
Stat. 2744 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1982)).
5. The California Desert contains portions of three desert regions: the Mojave, the
Sonoran, and the Great Basin. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MAN-
AGEMENT, CALIFORNIA DESERT CONSERVATION AREA PLAN SUMMARY 3 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CDCA PLAN SUMMARY]. The California Desert Conservation Area, a planning
area created under FLPMA, encompasses approximately 12 million of the 15 million acres
of public land in California.
6. Groundwater from public land in California is an important part of California's
water supply. See C. WHEATLEY, STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND USE
OF WATER RESOURCES ON PUBLIC LANDS 1-3 to 1-8 (1969) (prepared for the Public Land
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water,7 which can be tapped by developing water wells.8
Because groundwater supplies in California are limited,9 conflicts
arise over rights to groundwater use on public land.'0 The laws gov-
erning rights to the groundwater, however, are unclear. The BLM and
the courts, in resolving disputes between potential groundwater users,
must apply both federal and state law. This task is made difficult by
uncertainty as to the scope of the various laws and the apparent con-
flicts between them.
This lack of clear understanding of the laws controlling ground-
water extraction also interferes with the BLM's land management
objectives of promoting human use of public land" while preventing
the environmental damage associated with groundwater overdraft.' 2
The BLM, to achieve its goals, must become aware of the parameters of
its regulatory authority.
The purpose of this Note is to explicate groundwater rights on
public land in California by analyzing and reconciling the applicable
federal and state statutory and common laws. The Note defines the
scope of federal and state regulation over groundwater extraction on
public land in California, and defines the private rights that may be
Law Review Comm'n). Millions of gallons of groundwater are consumed in public use of
the public lands, such as for recreation and livestock grazing. Id. at J-I 1 to J-16.
7. Groundwater is created when rain, melting snow, and other moisture seeps down
into the earth through cracks and pores in the soil and rock and eventually reaches a layer of
rock beyond which it cannot pass. The water then collects in the porous layers of soil and
rock that lie above the impervious layer. Porous layers of soil and rock that hold water in
usable quantities are known as aquifers. See V. CHOW, HANDBOOK OF APPLIED HYDROL-
OGY: A COMPENDIUM OF WATER RESOURCES TECHNOLOGY 4-6 to 4-12 (1964); N. HINDS,
GEOMORPHOLOGY: THE EVOLUTION OF A LANDSCAPE 732-33 (1943); R. LINSLEY, M.
KOHLER, & J. PAULHUS, HYDROLOGY FOR ENGINEERS 182 (1982) [hereinafter cited as R.
LINSLEY].
8. A well traditionally is defined as a "deep, narrow pit dug in the earth .... usually
walled, for the purpose of obtaining a supply of water." Andrews v. Cross, 8 F. 269, 275
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1881). Today there are a variety of well designs and construction tech-
niques. See infra note 250.
9. See A. SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA: BACKGROUND AND
ISSUES (1977) (prepared for Governor's Comm'n to Review California Water Rights Law).
"The rate at which groundwater basins are recharged does not keep up with groundwater
pumping." Id at 1.
10. See, e.g., Desert Survivors, 80 Interior Bd. Land App. 111 (1984). A dispute arose
between an outdoor group and a mining company over the use of a groundwater source in
the California Desert. The outdoor group claimed that the water source was a public well.
The mining company claimed an exclusive right to the water. Id.
11. The federal government's policy under FLPMA is to promote human use of public
land. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1982).
12. An overdraft occurs when the pumping rate exceeds the rate at which the basin is
being recharged. See A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 1. In Desert Survivors, 80 Interior Bd.
Land App. at 111, an administrative law judge found a potentially serious adverse environ-
mental impact where extraction from a well in excess of the safe yield could reduce surface
water flow down-canyon and thus threaten a rare species of salamander.
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acquired. First, the Note describes the federal government's power to
reserve certain water wells' 3 on public land without regard to state law
and the permitted uses of the reserved water. 14 Second, it summarizes
California water law and analyzes its effect upon groundwater extrac-
tion on public land.' 5 Third, it explores the scope of indirect federal
regulation of structures built to extract groundwater and the scope of
federal control over the diversion of water across public land.' 6 Fi-
nally, the Note summarizes guidelines for the BLM, the courts, and
others to use in assessing groundwater rights in a particular case. 17
History and Background of Water Rights on Public Land
Management of Public Land
Fifteen million acres of public land in California are owned by the
federal government and administered by the BLM. 18 For many years
the source of the authority under which the BLM operated was un-
clear.' 9 It derived its management power from over 3000 statutes,
sometimes conflicting, which had been enacted over the course of a
century.20 After many years of effort and numerous attempts, Congress
in 1976 adopted a comprehensive public land management program,
FLPMA,21 which gave the BLM a simplified and solid basis for manag-
ing public land. FLPMA, however, by its terms does not affect water
rights on public land,22 which for the most part are defined by other
federal and state laws.
Federal Power to Reserve Water Rights
The federal government's power to regulate water use on federal
land has three constitutional sources: the commerce clause,23 the prop-
erty clause,24 and the supremacy clause.25 Under the commerce clause,
the federal government has the power to regulate watercourses that af-
13. See infra notes 23-113 & accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 114-15 & accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 118-239 & accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 240-302 & accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 303-26 & accompanying text.
18. See supra note 1.
19. SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at
53 (1978).
20. Id.
21. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1982).
22. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579,
§ 701(g)(1), (2), 90 Stat. 2786.
23. The commerce clause gives Congress the power to "regulate Commerce... among
the several States." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. The property clause gives Congress the power to "dispose of and make all needful
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fect navigation.26 The property clause grants the federal government
power as a landowner to manage or to dispose of its property as it sees
fit. 27 The supremacy clause affirms the federal government's right to
assert its power under the property and commerce clauses without re-
gard to state law.28 Despite its constitutional powers to regulate water
use on its land without regard to state law,29 the federal government
historically has allowed states to regulate most water use on public
land.30
When the federal government reserves land, however, it often ex-
pressly or impliedly reserves the water rights necessary to carry out the
purposes of the land reservation. 3' Reserved water rights, though gen-
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
25. The supremacy clause states that the United States Constitution and laws under it
"shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 3, cl. 2.
26. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899). The
Supreme Court stated that the power of the states to regulate water use "is limited by the
superior power of the General Government to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all
navigable streams within the limits of the United States."
27. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963).
28. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976). See also infra note 31.
29. 373 U.S. at 598. The Court stated that there is '"no doubt about the power of the
United States under [the property and commerce] clauses to reserve water rights for its reser-
vations and its property." Id.
30. See infra notes 118-38 & accompanying text.
31. See Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473, 475
(1975). The reserved water rights doctrine is also known as the Winters doctrine, after Win-
ters v. United States, 207 U.S. 565 (1908). In Winters, the Supreme Court implied a reserved
right to water in a treaty that set aside public land for the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.
The Court reasoned that Congress' intent in establishing the reservation could not be accom-
plished without sufficient water to irrigate the land. Id. at 576.
In Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955), the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether Oregon could prevent a federal licensee from building a dam on federal land
reserved for that purpose. The state, relying on California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935), as well as its analysis of legislation from the
1800's, argued that Congress had given states the power to regulate water on federal land.
The Court rejected the argument on the ground that federal deference to state water law
does not apply to reserved land. Id. at 448.
In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the Court confirmed that reserved water
rights might be implied from any federal land reservation. The Court upheld a finding that
the federal government intended to reserve water sufficient for the present and future re-
quirements of Lake Mead National Recreation Area, Havasu Lake National Wildlife Ref-
uge, Imperial National Wildlife Refuge, and Gila National Forest. Id. at 600-01.
In Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), the Court extended the reserved
water rights doctrine by finding that the addition of Devil's Hole to Death Valley National
Monument also reserved groundwater necessary to maintain the water level in the hole.
Devil's Hole is a limestone cavern inhabited by a unique species of pupfish whose ancestors
date to the Pleistocene Era. Id. at 132. Overdrafting of wells on the Cappaert Ranch was
threatening the pupfish with extinction by lowering the level in the hole. Id. at 133-34.
The Court found that when Congress added Devil's Hole to Death Valley National
[Vol. 35
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erally associated with reserved land, are relevant to public land because
some water sources on public land may be reserved by the federal
government.3 2
Reservations of Groundwater in Wells on Public Land
Although public land by definition is not reserved land,33 some
water sources on public land are reserved. The most significant reser-
vations were created by the Oil and Gas Well Conversion Act (Well
Conversion Act)34 and the Executive Order of April 17, 1926 (Execu-
tive Order).35 The Well Conversion Act provided for the reservation of
water wells developed incident to oil and gas prospecting.3 6 The Exec-
utive Order established a blanket reservation of springs and water
holes.37
Monument, it implicitly reserved unappropriated water necessary to carry out the purposes
of the reservation, including preservation of the pupfish. Id at 141. The Cappaerts were
thereby restricted in the amount of water they could pump from their wells. Id. at 143 n.7.
In United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978), the Forest Service contended
that the reservation of Gila National Forest included insfream water flow for recreation,
wildlife preservation, and livestock watering. The Supreme Court, however, drew a distinc-
tion between the primary and secondary purposes of a federal reservation and held that only
the primary purposes provided a basis for reserving water rights. Id at 700-02. Reserved
water rights, moreover, were not created unless "without the water the purposes of the reser-
vation would be entirely defeated." Id at 700 (citation omitted).
Because recreation, wildlife preservation, and livestock watering were only secondary
purposes of the reservation of Gila National Forest, the Forest Service could acquire water
rights only "in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator." Id. at 701-02.
The Court based its holding in part on the history of federal deference to state water law.
Id.
32. See infra notes 33-113 & accompanying text.
33. See supra note 2.
34. Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, § 40,48 Stat. 977 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 229a (1982)).
35. Exec. Order of April 17, 1926, reprinted in 51 Pub. Lands Dec. 457 (1926) (establish-
ing Public Water Reserve No. 107).
36. The Well Conversion Act, prior to amendment by FLPMA, provided in part:
All prospecting permits and leases for oil or gas made or issued under the provi-
sions of this chapter shall be subject to the condition that in case the permittee or
lessee strikes water while drilling instead of oil or gas, the Secretary of the Interior
may, when such water is of such quality and quantity as to be valuable and usable
at a reasonable cost for agricultural, domestic or other purposes, purchase the cas-
ing in the well at the reasonable value thereof to be fixed under rules and regula-
tions to be prescribed by the Secretary; Provided, That the land on which such well
is situated shall be reserved as a water hole under section 300 of Title 43.
43 U.S.C. § 229(a) (1970).
37. The Executive Order provides in part:
Under and pursuant to the provisions of the [Pickett] Act. it is hereby ordered
that every smallest legal subdivision of the public-land surveys which is vacant
unappropriated unreserved public land and contains a spring or water hole, and all
land within one quarter of a mile of every spring or water hole located on unsur-
veyed public land be, and the same is hereby, withdrawn from settlement, location,
July 1984]
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Although the Well Conversion Act expressly applies to wells,
which are manmade water sources, 38 there has been disagreement as to
whether the Executive Order also applies to manmade water sources
such as wells.39 If the Executive Order does apply, it would provide an
additional basis for federal regulation of certain groundwater extrac-
tion on public land and would limit the scope of private rights on pub-
lic land.40
Both the Executive Order and the Well Conversion Act were part
of an ongoing effort by Congress to develop and preserve water sources
on public land.41 Knowledge of their shared origin and common pur-
pose is fundamental to understanding the scope of their application.
Origins of the Executive Order and Well Conversion Act
The origins of reservations of water sources on public land under
the Executive Order and the Well Conversion Act can be traced to the
Pickett Act, which was enacted in 1910,42 and to the Stock-Raising
Homestead Act of 1916.43 The Pickett Act authorized the Executive to
withdraw land44 for "public purposes. '45 The scope of the withdrawal
authorization was clarified and extended by section 10 of the Stock-
Raising Homestead Act of 1916.46 Section 10 specifically authorized the
Executive to withdraw public land containing water holes or other bod-
ies of water needed or used by the public. 47
Congress' purpose in authorizing the Executive to reserve water
sources was to prevent private monopolization of public land.48 Con-
sale, or entry, and reserved for public use in accordance with the provisions of [the
Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916]....
51 Pub. Lands Dec. 457.
38. See supra note 8.
39. See infra notes 68-96 & accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 114-15 & accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 42-51 & accompanying text.
42. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, § 1, 36 Stat. 847 (repealed 1976).
43. Act of Dec. 29, 1916, ch. 9, § 10, 29 Stat. 865 (repealed 1976).
44. See supra note 2.
45. See supra note 42.
46. Section 10 provided in part:
Lands containing water holes or other bodies of water needed or used by the public
for watering purposes. . . may be reserved. . . and such land. . . shall, while so
reserved, be kept and held open to the public use for such purposes under such
general rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe ....
47. Id
48. H.R. REP. No. 35, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916), provides in part:
This is a new section, and authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw from
entry and hold open for the general use of the public, important water holes,
springs, and other bodies of water that are necessary for large surrounding tracts of
country; so that a person cannot monopolize or control a large territory by locating
as a homestead the only available water supply for stock in that vicinity.
[Vol. 35
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gress sought to prevent an individual from gaining control of a large
area by homesteading a parcel of public land that contained the only
available water in that area, and thus reserved such water sources for
public use.49 The withdrawal authorizations of the Pickett Act and the
Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 were repealed by FLPMA,50 but
reservations made under the authority of the two acts before the pas-
sage of FLPMA remain in effect. 5 '
The Executive Order
Under the authority granted by the Pickett Act and the Stock-
Raising Homestead Act of 1916, President Coolidge issued an Execu-
tive Order on April 17, 1926, withdrawing from settlement, location,
sale, and entry any parcel of public land containing a "spring or water
hole."' 52 Despite its broad language, the scope of the Executive Order
historically has been limited to preventing private monopolization of
public land, and thus the Order has been applied only to water sources
that provide enough water for use by the general public.5 3 Water
sources that yield only enough water for one family are not covered.5 4
In addition, the present position of the Interior Department is that all
the water in a source covered by the Executive Order is not necessarily
reserved.55 Rather, the Order has been interpreted to reserve only the
amount of water necessary for general human and animal
consumption.5 6
49. Id. See also Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife
Service, Bureau of Reclamation and Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553, 581
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Krulitz Opinion].
50. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), Pub. L. No. 94-
579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2744.
51. Id. § 701(c) (a saving clause).
52. See supra notes 35, 37 & accompanying text.
53. Regulations published with the Executive Order provide in part:
The... order was designed to preserve for general public use and benefit unre-
served public lands containing water holes or other bodies of water needed or used
by the public for watering purposes. It is not therefore to be construed as applying
to or reserving from homestead or other entry lands having small springs or water
holes affording only enough water for the use of one family and its domestic ani-
mals. It withdraws those springs and water holes capable of providing enough
water for general use for watering purposes.
51 Pub. Lands Dec. 457 (1926).
This limited interpretation of the Executive Order was recently confirmed in Purposes
of Executive Order of April 17, 1926, Establishing Public Water Reserve No. 107, 90 Interior
Dec. 81 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Coldiron Opinion].
54. See supra note 53.
55. Coldiron Opinion, 90 Interior Dec. at 82-83.
56. Id. The Coldiron Opinion's narrow interpretation of the Executive Order has been
criticized as impractical and inconsistent with the broad purpose of the Order. See Note,
Reevaluating the Applicabiliy ofthe Reservation Doctrine to Public Water Reserve No. 107, 26
ARIZ. L. REv. 127 (1984).
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Thus, water reserved under the Executive Order remains available
for public use. All use, however, is subject to federal regulation, both
to protect other resources and to ensure continued public access to the
water source. 57 In no case may a user acquire a legal right to the re-
served water.58
Well Conversion Act
The Secretary of the Interior, through the BLM, regulates oil and
gas prospecting on public land through a permit system.59 Frequently,
oil and gas prospectors strike water.60 Under the terms of prospecting
permits issued prior to passage of the Well Conversion Act, oil and gas
prospectors were required to plug water wells they inadvertently devel-
oped, even if the water could be put to beneficial use.61
The Well Conversion Act allows the federal government to pre-
serve and to regulate water wells developed by oil and gas prospectors
by requiring that when such prospectors strike water, they must offer
the well casings to the Secretary of the Interior for their reasonable
value.62 Under the Act, the Secretary of the Interior may operate the
well or lease it to others for the purpose of producing water for use on
or off the public land.63 In addition, owners or occupants of land adja-
cent to the well receive priority to the use of the water.64
Before FLPMA was enacted,65 all water wells developed by oil
and gas prospectors and purchased by the Secretary of the Interior
were reserved as water holes under the Executive Order and the Stock-
Raising Homestead Act of 1916.66 Because the Executive Order and
57. See Krulitz Opinion, 86 Interior Dec. at 587-89.
58. Coldiron Opinion, 90 Interior Dec. at 82-83.
59. 30 U.S.C. §§ 223-236a (1982).
60. 78 CONG. REC. 11,116 (1934) (statement of Sen. O'Mahoney).
61. Id. at 11,117. The Senator cited an incident in Wyoming in which prospectors
drilled to a depth of 2,250 feet, failed to strike oil, but struck water at 1,750 feet with a flow
of 42,000 gallons per day. Id. at 11,116. Under the regulations, the prospectors were liable
for the cost of plugging the well, even though the water was suitable for livestock. Id. at
11,116-17.
62. 43 U.S.C. § 229a(a) (1982).
63. Id § 229a(c).
64. Id.
65. FLPMA repealed the reservation authorization, but reservations made prior to
FLPMA remain in effect. See supra notes 50-51 & accompanying text.
66. See supra note 36, for the text of the relevant portion of the Well Conversion Act
prior to amendment by FLPMA. The regulations provided in part:
If the water is found to be valuable and usable at a reasonable cost for any of the
purposes specified in the Act, the land subdivision which contains the well will, if
subject thereto, be held to be withdrawn by Executive Order of April 17, 1926, and
reserved for public use pursuant to [the Stock-Raising Homestead Act] as a water
hole.
30 C.F.R. § 241.5 (1938) (superseded).
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the legislation that authorized the Order were the authority for reserv-
ing water wells under the Well Conversion Act, the Executive Order
and the Well Conversion Act serve a common federal purpose, the
preservation of water sources on public land.
67
Water Wells Under the Executive Order
Despite the common purpose of the Well Conversion Act and the
Executive Order, administrative decisions conflict on the issue of
whether water wells or other man-made water sources not within the
scope of the Well Conversion Act can be reserved under the Executive
Order. Four Interior Department decisions in the 1930's and a 1979
Solicitor's Opinion 68 have addressed this issue.69
In Santa Fe Pacfc Railroad,70 a reservoir had been constructed for
livestock watering.7' Its sole source of water was runoff collected occa-
sionally from two small canyons. 72 The issue arose as to whether the
reservoir was reserved under the Executive Order. 73 The decision
stated that the Executive Order did not contemplate the reservation of
"mere dry depressions or draws which do not, in their natural condi-
tion, furnish or retain a supply of water for public use." 74
A similar conclusion was reached in the 1938 decision of A. T
West & Sons.75 This case involved Johnny Creek Spring, a water hole
or seep that had been developed and maintained as a livestock water-
ing place by the West family for over fifty years.76 Citing Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad,77 the Interior Department decision held that since the
water source was developed entirely by the West's own efforts, it was
not a water source reserved by the Executive Order.
78
In State of New Mexico,7 9 however, the Department found that the
67. The relationship between the Well Conversion Act and the Executive Order was
also discussed in Park Center Water Dist. and the Canon Heights Irrigation and Reservoir
Co., 84 Interior Dec. 87, 90 (1977).
68. A Solicitor's Opinion is a legal memorandum, binding on the Interior Department,
which addresses only questions of law. See, e.g., Krulitz Opinion, 86 Interior Dec. at 583-85.
69. See infra notes 70-96 & accompanying text. The Interior Department has an ad-
ministrative appeals procedure whereby BLM decisions may be appealed. See 43 C.F.R.
§§ 4.400-.478 (1984).
70. 53 Interior Dec. 210 (1930).
71. Id. at 211.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 56 Interior Dec. 387 (1938).
76. Id at 388-89.
77. 53 Interior Dec. 210 (1930).
78. 56 Interior Dec. at 389.
79. 55 Interior Dec. 466 (1936).
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Executive Order did apply to a particular man-made water source. 80
This decision involved an artesian well that had been drilled after the
date of the Executive Order and that the Department had previously
found to be a valuable public watering place.81 The Department ana-
lyzed the Executive Order and the regulations promulgated under it,
and found no language restricting the meaning of the phrase "spring or
water hole" to water sources created solely by the forces of nature.
"[T]he fact that it was developed or brought into being by human
agency. . . would not take it out of the letter or spirit of the order."82
The Department also found that the Executive Order provided for
continuing withdrawal of any water source of the type described in the
order.8 3 Therefore, the fact that the well was developed after the Exec-
utive Order was issued did not remove it from the scope of the order.8 4
Lee J Esplin85 involved a reservoir which collected runoff that oc-
casionally flowed down a canyon.8 6 As in Santa Fe Pacific Railroad,87
no streams, springs, or seeps fed the reservoir.88 The Department held
that the Executive Order did not apply to the reservoir, 9 but that the
order would attach should the developer abandon the reservoir.90
Over forty years later, however, Solicitor Krulitz's opinion 9' de-
cided that the Executive Order reserved only those water sources that
came into existence naturally prior to the passage of FLPMA.92 The
opinion stated that when man-made water sources are abandoned, the
federal government as landowner becomes the owner of the water
sources and may put the water to beneficial use.93 Although portions of
the Krulitz Opinion have been criticized 94 and in part have been super-
seded,95 its ruling on man-made water sources such as wells is still
80. Id. at 467.
81. Id. at 466-67.
82. Id. at 467.
83. Id. at 468.
84. Id
85. 56 Interior Dec. 325 (1938).
86. Id. at 326-27.
87. 53 Interior Dec. at 210.
88. 56 Interior Dec. at 327.
89. Id at 329.
90. Id. at 328. The concept that the water source passes to the United States upon
abandonment was also adopted in the Krulitz Opinion, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979).
91. Krulitz Opinion, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979).
92. Id at 584 n.45, 587.
93. Id at 585.
94. See, e.g., Simms, National Water Policy in the Wake of United States v. New Alex-
ico, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1980) (criticizing the Krulitz Opinion's discussion of "non-
reserved" water rights).
95. Coldiron Opinion, 90 Interior Dec. at 83 (Coldiron modified the portion of the Kru-
litz Opinion that stated that the total flow of water sources on reserved land was also re-
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binding authority within the Interior Department.96
Toward A Balancing Approach: A Critique of the Krulitz Opinion
The Krulitz Opinion's automatic exclusion of man-made water
sources from the ambit of the Executive Order is ill-founded. Nothing
on the face of the Executive Order, the legislation that authorized the
Order, or the regulations promulgated under the Order excludes water
wells or other man-made water sources.97
Four reasons support a broad interpretation of the Executive Or-
der's withdrawal of land containing a "spring or water hole." 98 First,
the distinction between natural and man-made water sources is not al-
ways clear, a fact that the Krulitz Opinion ignores. For instance, in its
natural condition an aquifer that intersects with the surface may result
in only a small spring or seep, or the discharge from a spring may fluc-
tuate seasonally.99 Where such a spring or seep has been artificially
enlarged, lined, or otherwise altered to increase its flow, to make the
supply more constant, or to make the water more accessible to humans
or livestock, it may be difficult to classify as either natural or man-
made.1o
Second, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, which is one of
the seminal pieces of legislation in this area and is closely tied to the
Executive Order, expressed the broad intent of Congress to preserve
important public water sources on public land. This Act authorized the
Executive to withdraw land containing "water holes or other bodies of
water."'' The phrase "other bodies of water" certainly encompasses
man-made water sources, such as wells.
Third, Congress and the Interior Department historically have in-
terpreted the term "water hole" as used in the Executive Order to in-
clude water wells. The Well Conversion Act and the regulations
promulgated under it specified that if the Secretary of the Interior
chose to preserve a water well developed by oil and gas prospectors, the
served. According to Coldiron, only water needed for human and animal consumption was
reserved).
96. The BLM publishes a manual that includes a section on water rights. See BUREAU
OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, MANUAL (1984) (Release No. 7-
86) [hereinafter cited as BLM MANUAL]. The California BLM office publishes a supplement.
CALIFORNIA STATE OFFICE, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANUAL (1982) (Release
No. 7-5) [hereinafter cited as BLM MANUAL (CALIFORNIA)]. The BLM MANUAL states that
only natural springs and waterholes were withdrawn by the Executive Order. BLM MAN-
UAL, supra, at § 7250.12(A)(2); BLM MANUAL (CALIFORNIA), supra, at § 7250.11(3).
97. State of New Mexico, 56 Interior Dec. at 467.
98. See supra note 37.
99. See R. LINSLEY, supra note 7, at 186.
100. Such enlargement of a spring or seep apparently occurred in 4. T West & Sons, 56
Interior Dec. at 387.
101. See supra note 46.
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well would be reserved "as a water hole" under the Executive Order
and the legislation that authorized the order.10 2 Indeed, State of New
Mexico, which was decided only ten years after the Executive Order
was issued, held that a water well could be a "water hole" subject to the
Executive Order. 03
Finally, and most importantly, Solicitor Krulitz assumed that pri-
vate control of a man-made water source could not lead to monopoliza-
tion of a large area of public land. 0 4 Prevention of such
monopolization was the primary objective of the Executive Order. So-
licitor Krulitz' assumption, however, is contrary to the hydrology and
economics of groundwater extraction.
The hydrological feasibility of well development often depends on
how close the aquifer' 05 is to the surface. 06 If the aquifer is close to the
surface in only one location, control of this location will control the
access to the entire aquifer. If the aquifer is the only water available in
the area, others whose use of the surrounding land depends upon water
could be excluded. Such private monopolization of public land by con-
trol of a water source is precisely what the Executive Order and the
legislation that authorized the Order sought to prevent. 107
Economic factors may also make a particular water well an im-
portant water source. For example, a well may be developed as the
primary water source in a desert area when large-scale mining or other
commercial activity justifies such an investment. Should this well fall
into private control, others, such as recreational visitors or miners
whose activity on the land depended on access to water from the well,
might be excluded from the surrounding public land unless they could
afford to develop new wells. 0 8
102. See supra notes 36, 66.
103. 56 Interior Dec. at 467.
104. See Krulitz Opinion, 86 Interior Dec. at 584-85. The opinion stated that the purpose
of the Executive Order was "to reserve naturally occurring water sources ... to prevent
monopolization of large tracts of surrounding land by one or a few individuals. It was not
intended to reserve lands containing artificial sources .... " There is a gap in the logic
between these two sentences. While it is true that the Executive Order's purpose was to
prevent private monopolization of public land, it does not necessarily follow that this pre-
cludes the reservation of man-made water sources such as wells.
105. An aquifer is a layer of soil and rock that holds water in usable quantities. See
supra note 7.
106. The terrain above an aquifer may vary radically. For example, a hill often rises
many feet above an aquifer. N. HINDS, supra note 7, at 733. A valley often dips close to an
aquifer or even intersects with the aquifer, creating a spring or stream. Id. See also R.
LINSLEY, supra note 7, at 176. In addition, geologic processes may fold and distort the layers
of rock so that an aquifer is close to the surface in some places and far away in others. A
locally confined impervious layer may result in a small aquifer perched high above other
aquifers in the area. R. LINSLEY, supra note 7, at 176, 187.
107. See supra notes 42-51 & accompanying text.
108. Well development could occur, for example, during the "boom" phase of boom and
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To prevent such monopolization, any man-made water source,
such as a well, that existed prior to the passage of FLPMA10 9 should be
treated as potentially within the scope of the Order. A determination
of whether a particular water source is reserved under the Executive
Order should be based on a balancing of the factors relevant to advanc-
ing the policy of preventing private control of the water source from
leading to monopolization of a large area of public land. Factors of
paramount importance include whether the source yields enough water
for general purposes and whether other water is available nearby." 0
Two other factors that should be considered are the historical use
of the water source and the amount of maintenance necessary. If the
source historically has been under private control, it is unlikely that the
well is an important public water source." ', Similarly, if the source his-
torically has been used by the public, attempts to assert private control
over it should be blocked unless a showing is made that private control
of the source would not monopolize public land. 1 2 Finally, a source
that requires a great deal of maintenance to remain usable would not
lend itself to public use." 3 A balancing of these factors will help deter-
mine whether a well is reserved under the Executive Order.
Once a water well has been found to be reserved under the Well
Conversion Act or the Executive Order, the BLM may protect the
source from private interference 14 and need not consider state law.115
bust mining, described in the CDCA PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 4. When the large
mineral deposits have been exhausted, later users of the area may have to rely on improve-
ments made when profit potential justified such investment because well development can
be complicated and costly. See supra note 250.
109. FLPMA repealed the acts which authorized withdrawals under the Executive Or-
der. See supra note 50.
110. Cf. Coldiron Opinion, 90 Interior Dec. at 83 (defining reserved sources as those that
"provide the water supply for tracts of public domain land larger than the 640 acres allowed
to be homesteaded by an individual").
111. See, e.g., A.T. West & Sons, 56 Interior Dec. 387, 387 (1938). The fact that the
water source had been under continuous control of the Wests was an important factor in the
Interior Department's finding that the water source was not reserved. See id. at 389.
112. The Board of Land Appeals recently set aside BLM approval of a mining plan of
operations that gave the miner exclusive control of a water source alleged by the appellants
to be a water source historically used by backpackers. See Desert Survivors, 80 Interior Bd.
of Land App. 111 (1984). The Board found that the BLM had not conducted an adequate
examination as to the nature of the water source. Id. at 116.
113. See, e.g., A.T. West & Sons, 56 Interior Dec. at 389. The source had been continu-
ously maintained by the Wests for over 50 years, a factor that led the Department to con-
clude that the water source was not reserved. Id.
114. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141-43 (1976). Groundwater sufficient
to carry out the purposes of the reservation is reserved. Thus, private interference, such as
pumping from a well on nearby public land, can be regulated. Cf. id. at 143 n.7. See also
Park Center Water Dist. and the Canon Heights Irrigation and Reservoir Co., 84 Interior
Dec. 87, 90-91 (1977) (applying Cappaert to the Well Conversion Act).
115. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141-43.
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However, water wells outside the scope of the Order or the Well Con-
version Act are subject to state water law. 16 State water law applies
even though the federal government has the constitutional power to
regulate all water use on all federal land.' 17 Except for the reservations
of water discussed above, the federal government historically has de-
ferred to state regulation of water on public land.
History and Background of State Regulation of Water Use on
Public Land
Federal Deference to State Water Law
Federal deference to state regulation of water use on public land
dates back to the California Gold Rush, when miners on public land
diverted streams from their natural courses and used the water in min-
ing operations." 8 In California, the miners determined priority of
water rights by a custom of "prior appropriation" or "first in time, first
in right."'"19
Congress passed three acts during the 1800's that validated this
custom. The first act, the Mining Act of 1866, allowed free lode mining
on public land.' 20 A provision of the Act specifically protected vested
rights recognized by state and local statutes, customs, and court deci-
sions regarding water use on public land.' 2 ' In the Act of 1870 Con-
gress amended the Act of 1866 to extend its coverage to placer
mining. 22 This Act validated state and local water use regulation on
public land by providing that federal patents 23 and homesteads would
116. For instance, other water may be available nearby, so the well would not be re-
served. Further, wells developed after the passage of FLPMA are outside the scope of the
Order. See supra note 50. Such nonreserved water sources are governed by state law.
117. See supra notes 25-32 & accompanying text.
118. W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 164 (U.S.D.A.
Misc. Pub. No. 1206, 1974).
119. W. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 41-43 (1956). The min-
ers also developed similar customs to determine mineral rights on public land. Grow &
Stewart, The Winters Doctrine as Federal Common Law, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 457, 486
n.16 (1980).
120. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 51,43
U.S.C. § 661 (1982)).
121. 30 U.S.C. § 51 provides, in part:
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricul-
tural, manufacturing, or other purposes have vested and accrued, and the same are
recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of
courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and
protected in the same.
122. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 218 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 52, 43
U.S.C. § 661 (1982)).
123. A patent is a conveyance by which the United States passes title to parcels of public
land. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 640 (1881).
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be subject to vested water rights. 124
The third act, the Desert Land Act of 1877, allowed persons to
homestead public land in western states by irrigating and reclaiming
it.125 The Act specified, however, that the right to use water for such
reclamation would depend upon "bona fide prior appropriation."' 126
Any surplus water was to remain free for appropriation and use by the
public "subject to existing rights."' 27
In California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.,' 28
the Supreme Court interpreted the Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877 to indi-
cate congressional deference to state water law. The dispute in Califor-
nia Oregon Power arose when the power company sought to prevent the
cement company from interfering with the flow of a river adjoining the
power company's land.129 The issue was whether a United States pat-
ent, the source of the power company's land title, carried with it a com-
mon law riparian right assuring continued flow of the river.' 30 Oregon
water law did not recognize such a right. 13'
The Court found that the Acts of 1866 and 1870 confirmed that the
water laws of western states would determine rights in non-navigable
water on public land.' 32 The Court further found that the Desert Land
Act of 1877 "effected a severance of all waters upon the public domain,
124. 30 U.S.C. § 52 provides: "All patents granted, or homesteads allowed, shall be
subject to any vested and accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs used in
connection with such water rights, as may have been acquired under or recognized by sec-
tion 51 of this title."
125. Desert Land Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 321 (1982)).
126. 43 U.S.C. § 321 provides in part:
[T]he right to the use of water by the person so conducting the same, on or to any
tract of desert land of three hundred and twenty acres shall depend upon bona fide
prior appropriation; and such right shall not exceed the amount of water actually
appropriated, and necessarily used for the purpose of irrigation and reclamation;
and all surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together
with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of water supply upon the pub-
lic lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation
and use of the public for irrigation, mining, and manufacturing purposes subject to
existing rights.
127. Id.
128. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
129. Id. at 150-51.
130. Id at 151-52.
131. Id. at 152-53.
132. Id at 155.
The effect of these acts is not limited to rights acquired before 1866. They reach
into the future as well, and approve and confirm the policy of appropriation for a
beneficial use, as recognized by local rules and customs, and the legislation and
judicial decisions of the arid-land states, as the test and measure of private rights in
and to the non-navigable waters on the public domain.
Id (citations omitted).
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not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself."' 33 The Court con-
cluded that following the Act of 1877, if not before, non-navigable wa-
ters on public land became "publici juris, subject to the plenary control
of the designated states." 1 34 Thus, the Court held that the United States
patent did not carry with it a common law riparian right assuring the
continued flow of the river along the power company's land., 35
The Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877 established a general rule that
water rights on public land must be acquired under state law. As seen
previously, an exception to this rule applies when water sources on
public land are reserved. 136 Because the Interior Department narrowly
construes such reservations, 137 the rights to most water sources on pub-
lic land will be determined by state law.' 38
California Water Law
California recognizes two common law doctrines of water rights:
appropriative and riparian. This section briefly explores the two doc-
trines in the context of their impact on groundwater rights under Cali-
fornia law. In addition, because the California Constitution mandates
that all water use in the state must be reasonable and beneficial, the
"reasonable and beneficial use" limitation is discussed.
Appropriative Rights
In 1855 the California Supreme Court validated the prior appro-
priation doctrine in Irwin v. Phillos.139 In Irwin, the plaintiff had ap-
propriated water from a stream on public land for use in mining
operations some distance away.140 After the plaintiff had diverted the
stream water, the defendant miners established themselves downstream
on public land. 14 1 The defendants claimed that they should be entitled
to the stream water. 142 The court ruled that between two appropriators,
the earlier one holds the better right. To reach its decision, the court
validated the miners' custom of "first in time, first in right." 143
In 1872 the California legislature formally recognized the prior ap-
propriation doctrine by establishing a statutory appropriation proce-
133. Id at 158.
134. Id. at 163-64.
135. Id. at 165.
136. See supra notes 23-115 & accompanying text.
137. See Coldiron Opinion, 90 Interior Dec. 81, 82-83 (1983).
138. Id.
139. 5 Cal. 140, 146-47 (1855).
140. Id at 145.
141. Id.
142. Id at 145-46.
143. Id at 146-47.
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dure. 44 The procedure, however, was optional.' 45 In 1913 the
legislature passed the Water Commission Act to create a more compre-
hensive system of appropriation. 146 That Act was the basis for the cur-
rent California Water Code. 147
Under the Water Code, anyone wishing to appropriate surface
water must obtain a permit from the State Water Resources Control
Board. 148 The Board calculates the quantity of available, unappropri-
ated water. 149 It then decides how much water may be taken and how
much must remain in the water source for other beneficial purposes. 50
After the Board grants a permit, the permit holder must promptly di-
vert the water and put it to use, or the right to appropriate will be
lost. ' 5
Rioarian Rights
Thirty-one years after adopting the prior appropriation doctrine,
the California Supreme Court recognized the common law riparian
doctrine in Lux v. Haggin.I52 In Lux the court reasoned that when the
California legislature adopted the English common law in 1850, it
thereby adopted the common law riparian doctrine.' 5 3 Thus, the ripa-
rian doctrine entered into an uneasy coexistence with the prior appro-
priation doctrine.' 54
Under the common law riparian doctrine, water rights are based
on ownership of land that adjoins a pond, lake, or stream.' 55 The right
to use the water is part and parcel of the land, 56 and is neither created
nor destroyed by use or nonuse of the water. 57 Although riparian uses
are not subject to California's permit system, courts may limit the ex-
144. W. HUTCHINS, supra note 119, at 89.
145. Id. at 93.
146. Id at 94.
147. Id. at 94-95. See a/so CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100-4407 (West 1971) (codification of
the appropriation procedure).
148. CAL. WATER CODE § 1225 (West 1971). See also W. HUTCHINS, supra note 119, at
97-98.
149. See W. HUTCHINS, supra note 119, at 101-05; see also CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253,
1255, 1375 (West 1971).
150. See W. HUTCHINS, supra note 119, at 101-05.
151. See id at 108-18 (explaining the "use it or lose it" doctrine); see also CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 1395-1397 (West 1971).
152. 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
153. Id at 384-87, 10 P. at 749-51.
154. Debate continues as to the relative rights of riparian owners versus appropriators.
See D. ANDERSON, RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 1 (1977) (prepared for Governor's
Comm'n to Review California Water Rights).
155. W. HUTCHINS, supra note 119, at 52-53.
156. W. HUTCHINS, supra note 118, at 26.
157. Peake v. Harris, 48 Cal. App. 363, 192 P. 310 (1920).
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tent to which the right may be asserted.158 A landowner shares riparian
fights with other owners who adjoin the same water source and has a
correlative right to a reasonable share of the water for use on the ripa-
rian land.' 59
Under California's dual system of appropriative and riparian
rights, priority between users is determined by the dates when the
users' rights came into existence. An appropriator's right vests on the
date of the permit application. 160 A riparian owner's fight dates from
the time the original owner acquired the land, 161 unless the original
owner was the state or federal government.' 62 Riparian rights attach to
public land after it is transferred from the public domain.' 63 Thus, the
riparian right of a public land grantee vests as of the date of the
grant. 164
Reasonable and Beneficial Use
In 1928 California voters adopted a constitutional amendment 165
158. In an adjudication to determine all the rights to a stream, the exercise of future
riparian rights may be severely limited. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.,
25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979). Water rights in California can also
be lost by prescription. See W. HUTCHINS, supra note 119, at 298-343.
159. Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. 124, 211 P. 11 (1922). "[T]he 'reasonable' amount to
which any one riparian owner is entitled is to be measured by comparison with the needs of
the other riparian proprietors." Id at 129, 211 P. at 13.
160. CAL. WATER CODE § 1450 (West 1971).
161. Riparian rights to land received by means of federal patent vest as of the date of
settlement with intent to patent. Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. at 131, 211 P. at 14. Riparian
rights associated with land received by means of Mexican land grants vested upon Califor-
nia's admission to the Union in 1850. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 335, 10 P. 674, 714 (1886).
Because riparian rights generally predate appropriative rights, some courts have incorrectly
asserted that riparian rights are always superior. See, e.g., Meridian v. San Francisco, 13
Cal. 2d 424, 91 P.2d 105 (1939). However, appropriative rights have in some cases been held
superior to the riparian rights. See, e.g., Jones v. Pleasant Valley Canal Co., 44 Cal. App. 2d
798, 113 P.2d 289 (1941). In an adjudication as to all rights in a stream, a riparian owner's
ability to assert her riparian rights may be limited. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek
Sys., 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979).
162. See McKinley Bros. v. McCauley, 215 Cal. 229, 1 P.2d 298 (1932).
163. Id See also Note, The Application of Calfornia Jflparian Water Rights Doctrine to
Federal Lands in the Mono Lake Basin, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (1983) (arguing that while
riparian rights do not attach to the public domain, they do attach when the federal govern-
ment deeds the land to a private individual or withdraws the land from the public domain
and reserves it for federal purposes).
164. See Note, supra note 163, at 1309.
165. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 provides:
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this State the
general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial
use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasona-
ble use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the conser-
vation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial
use thereof in the interest of the people and for public welfare. The right to water
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that included a water conservation policy affecting all uses of water in
California and providing that all water use in the state be reasonable
and beneficial. Although most water uses are beneficial, certain uses
may be unreasonable. 66 To determine reasonableness, a court must
balance one use of a particular water source against others.
When applying the constitutional mandate, California courts en-
deavor to arrive at physical solutions to water rights disputes. 67 Such
physical solutions are typically water-sharing arrangements between
competing users designed to avoid inequities that might occur were the
superior right afforded absolute protection. 68 In any dispute between
competing water users, a court may require the parties to share the
water by imposing a physical solution. 169
Groundwater Rights
California law recognizes two types of groundwater: water flow-
ing in an underground stream, and percolating groundwater.170 While
the hydrological distinction is dubious,' 71 the legal distinction appears
significant. Groundwater flowing in underground streams is subject to
California's permit system, while percolating groundwater is not.172
The legal distinction is diminished in importance, however, by the rule
that in the absence of proof to the contrary, groundwater is presumed
to be percolating. 73 Thus, the term "groundwater" as normally used
or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this
State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the
beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the
waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method
of diversion of water. Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, but to
no more than so much of the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently
with this section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may be made adapt-
able, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, however, that noth-
ing herein contained shall be construed as depriving any riparian owner of the
reasonable use of water of the stream to which the owner's land is riparian under
reasonable methods of diversion and use or as depriving any appropriator or water
to which the appropriator is lawfully entitled. This section shall be self-executing,
and the Legislature may also enact laws in the furtherance of the policy in this
section contained.
166. "It is well established that what is reasonable use of water varies with the facts and
circumstances of the particular case." Long Valley Creek, 25 Cal 3d at 354, 599 P.2d at 665,
158 Cal. Rptr. at 359. See also Joslin v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 139, 429
P.2d 889, 894, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 382 (1967).
167. See City of Lodi v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936).
168. Id. at 339.
169. Id. See also A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 17.
170. W. HUTCHINS, supra note 119, at 419.
171. V. CHow, supra note 7, at 27-29.
172. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200, 2500 (West 1971).
173. See Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 P. 585 (1899). This is the general rule
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means percolating groundwater.174
Under the common law rule, a landowner had absolute ownership
of the water beneath the land.175 These rights were termed "overlying
rights." 176 In 1903, however, the California Supreme Court rejected
the common law rule in Katz v. Walkinshaw.177 The court held that
absolute ownership of groundwater was not suited to California's arid
conditions.178
Instead, the Katz court defined overlying rights by analogizing to
riparian rights. 179 Both riparian rights and overlying rights are correla-
tive: each overlying landowner has a right to a reasonable share of
groundwater. 80 Both are based on ownership of the land and are not
created or destroyed by use or nonuse of the water.' 8s
If groundwater is extracted and diverted for use on nonoverlying
land, under California law such rights are "appropriative."' 8 2 In the
case of groundwater, overlying uses take precedence over appropriative
(nonoverlying) uses, regardless of whose right came into existence
first.' 8 3 There are sound reasons for this rule of priority. Overlying use
of groundwater, such as irrigation, may help to replenish the aquifer
from which the groundwater was extracted.' 84 As between two ground-
water appropriators, the rule of "first in time, first in right" applies.'8 5
California has no statutory procedure to regulate groundwater
use.186 Appropriative rights to groundwater are acquired simply by
in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., McGowan v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 439, 442 (D. Mont.
1962).
174. See Hutchins, California Ground Water: Legal Problems, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 688,
688-89 (1957) (discussing why the distinction is now relatively unimportant).
175. See Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
176. See A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 7.
177. 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903), afg on rehearing, 141 Cal. 138, 70 P. 663 (1902).
178. 141 Cal. at 133, 74 P. at 771.
179. 141 Cal. at 143, 70 P. at 666.
180. 141 Cal. at 136, 74 P. at 772 (stating that in "[d]isputes between overlying landown-
ers concerning water for use on the land, to which they have an equal right, in cases where
the supply is insufficient for all, are to be settled by giving to each a fair and just
proportion").
181. See, e.g., City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 925, 207 P.2d 17, 28
(1949); Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 160 Cal. 268, 116 P. 715 (1911). However, rights
can be lost by prescription. See Pasadena, 33 Cal. 2d at 926-27, 207 P.2d at 28-29.
182. Pasadena, 33 Cal. 2d at 925, 207 P.2d at 28.
183. Id at 925-26, 207 P.2d at 28-29.
184. The water may seep back through the soil into the aquifer. See supra note 7.
185. Katz, 141 Cal. at 135, 70 P. at 772.
186. See A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 91-92. In Inyo County, where groundwater
extraction by the City of Los Angeles has posed serious environmental threats, the voters
enacted a comprehensive groundwater ordinance. See Rossman & Steel, Forging the New
Water Law- PublIc Regulation of "Proprietary" Groundwater Rights, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 903
(1982). No appellate court has yet ruled on the several possible constitutional challenges to
the ordinance. Id.
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constructing a well and putting the water to beneficial use. 187 Conflicts
over groundwater use are resolved in state court. 188
California recognizes two types of causes of action regarding
groundwater use. First, any water user who claims a superior ground-
water right may sue to prevent interference with that right. 189 Second,
California recognizes broad standing to raise water use issues and per-
mits interested water users, such as environmental groups' 90 and the
State Water Board, 19 1 to sue to prevent unreasonable groundwater
use. 1
92
Rights to Groundwater on Public Land Under California Water
Law
While California recognizes both overlying and appropriative
rights to groundwater on private land, it recognizes only appropriative
rights on public land. 93 Thus, under California law, groundwater
rights on public land are based on the use of the water rather than on
ownership of the land.194 Groundwater rights are further influenced by
consideration of the strong state and federal policy to protect public use
of scarce water resources. 95
Defining Groundwater Rights on Public Land in California: Ruby E.
Huffman
In the Interior Department case of Ruby . Huffman, 196 the appel-
lants had applied to enter and homestead land in California under the
Desert Land Act. 197 The only water available was underground. 198
The appellants intended to develop wells to extract the groundwater. 199
The BLM denied their applications because no "bona fide prior appro-
187. H. ROGERS & A. NICHOLS, WATER FOR CALIFORNIA 359 (1967). The state must be
notified, however, of construction of a new well or enlargement or abandonment of an ex-
isting well. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13750-13751 (West 1971).
188. See A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 3.
189. See generally id
190. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 26 Cal. 3d 183,
605 P.2d 11 (1980) (a public interest organization was permitted to sue to enjoin allegedly
unreasonable use of water by a municipality).
191. CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 1971).
192. California law requires that all water use in the state be reasonable. See supra
notes 166-69 & accompanying text.
193. See Ruby E. Huffman, 64 Interior Dec. 57 (1957).
194. See infra notes 196-222 & accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 223-39 & accompanying text.
196. 64 Interior Dec. 57 (1957).
197. Id at 58. The right of a person to homestead and reclaim land under the Act is
called an "entry right." See 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1982).
198. 64 Interior Dec. at 59.
199. Id.
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priation" of water had been secured as required under the Desert Land
Act.2°° The BLM based its decision on a Solicitor's. Opinion regarding
desert land in Arizona. 20' In the Arizona opinion, the Solicitor had
interpreted "bona fide appropriation," as used in the Desert Land Act,
to mean a right under state law to a definite, fixed quantity of water
that could not be diverted by a subsequent water user.202 Because Ari-
zona's law required that groundwater use be "reasonable," the law was
deemed to be flexible rather than definite, and therefore incompatible
with the requirements of the Desert Land Act.203 Desert Land Act ap-
plications in Arizona were thus denied.2°4 In Huffman, the BLM rea-
soned that because California's doctrine of overlying correlative rights
also failed to establish rights to a definite quantity of groundwater, it
too was incompatible with a requirement of "bona fide prior
appropriation. '205
The Interior Board of Land Appeals,20 6 however, reversed the
BLM's denial of several desert land applications in California,20 7 bas-
ing its decision on the analogy that California courts had drawn be-
tween riparian and overlying rights.208 Under California law, the
Board noted, riparian rights do not attach to public land until the land
passes into private ownership.20 9 Uses of water from streams on public
land, even uses on land adjacent to the stream, are appropriative. 210
The Board held that the correlative right of an overlying land-
owner to groundwater does not attach to public land until the land has
passed into private ownership.21' Thus, all uses of groundwater prior to
receipt of the land patent are appropriative. 212 The Board concluded
that the appellants could acquire an appropriative right to groundwater
under public land in California, satisfying the Desert Land Act
requirements.213
200. Id. at 60-61. See also 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1982).
201. 64 Interior Dec. at 60. The BLM followed Oma B. Davidson, 63 Interior Dec. 79
(1956). That decision in turn was based on an earlier Solicitor's Opinion, Validity of Desert
Land Applications, 62 Interior Dec. 49 (1955) (regarding desert land entry in Arizona). See
Oma B. Davidson, 63 Interior Dec. at 80-81.
202. Oma B. Davidson, 63 Interior Dec. at 80.
203. Desert LandApplications, 62 Interior Dec. at 53.
204. Id at 54. See also 63 Interior Dec. at 80-81.
205. 64 Interior Dec. at 60.
206. The Interior Board of Land Appeals is the body that currently has jurisdiction over
appeals from BLM decisions. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.400-.478 (1984).
207. 64 Interior Dec. at 70.
208. Id. at 66.
209. Id Riparian rights also attach when land is withdrawn from the public domain.
See Note, supra note 163.
210. 64 Interior Dec. at 66-67.
211. Id
212. Id. at 67.
213. Id at 67-70.
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The Huffman analogy between overlying and riparian rights is
well supported by California law.2 14 Thus, it provides a basis for clari-
fying groundwater rights on public land in California. 215
Huffman classified groundwater use on overlying public land as
"appropriation. ' 21 6 The two traditional categories of California
groundwater rights, overlying and appropriative, are inadequate and
should be defined more precisely to recognize the right of groundwater
appropriation for overlying use on public land.2 1 7 The resulting cate-
gories can be defined as follows: 1) "correlative-overlying," the correl-
ative right of the landowner to utilize groundwater on overlying
land;21 8 2) "appropriative-overlying," the category discussed in
Huffman, for any overlying use of groundwater on public land;219 and
3) "appropriative-nonoverlying," the taking of water for use on non-
overlying land, public or private. 220
Under these definitions, all rights to extract groundwater on public
land in California are appropriative, based on use of the water rather
214. See supra notes 162-64 & accompanying text.
215. Because Huffman is a federal administrative decision, it did not alter California
law. It does, however, provide a good basis for suggesting ways to define existing California
law. Furthermore, it is binding precedent within the Interior Department. No California
court has considered groundwater rights on public land.
216. The term "appropriation," as applied to groundwater, traditionally has meant a
nonoverlying use. See, e.g., Katz, 141 Cal. at 135, 74 P. at 772. However, Huffman, 64
Interior Dec. at 67, applied the term "appropriation" to overlying uses of groundwater on
public land.
217. The term "overlying" in California groundwater law has been used to refer to a
right, a type of use, and a type of land. See A. SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 7. California
decisions have not clearly defined the term. For instance, an overlying use is not always the
same as use on overlying land. Id The term "appropriation" in the groundwater context
has referred to a right encompassing one type of use: appropriation or taking of ground-
water for use on nonoverlying land. Katz, 141 Cal. at 135, 74 P.2d at 772.
218. The term does not create a new concept, but rather describes more precisely the
groundwater rights of a landowner in California. The right is correlative if the type of use is
overlying. See supra notes 183-85 & accompanying text.
219. The term describes the category of rights to which Huffman alluded. The right is
appropriative, which affects the priority between users, see supra notes 183-85 & accompany-
ing text, and the type of use is overlying.
California already recognizes some appropriative overlying rights. Uses that are over-
lying, in the sense that the water is used on land above the aquifer, have been held to be
appropriative in cases involving municipalities. In San Bernadino v. Riverside, 186 Cal. 7,
198 P. 784 (1921), the plaintiff argued that the pumping of groundwater for use by customers
of a municipality overlying the aquifer was an overlying use. The court rejected this argu-
ment, holding that since the municipality did not possess the customers' water rights, the
municipality's extraction of the water was nonoverlying or "appropriative." Id at 24-25,
198 P. at 791-92.
220. The term does not create a new concept, but rather it more precisely defines appro-
priation for nonoverlying use, rights that traditionally have been labelled "appropriative."
See supra notes 182-85 & accompanying text. The right is appropriative, and the use is
nonoverlying.
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than on ownership of the land. For example, if the federal government
extracts groundwater from a converted oil or gas well acquired after
FLPMA, it acquires an appropriative-overlying or appropriative-
nonoverlying right depending on where the water is used.221 Thus,
most conflicts between potential groundwater users can and should be
resolved by applying the rule of prior appropriation. 222
State and Federal Policy Favors Protecting Public Use
While the Huffman approach puts all those who use water on pub-
lic land, including the federal government, on an equal basis under
California law, state and federal policy favor public use of scarce water
resources. For example, human consumption is considered the highest
use of water in California. 223 In addition, California courts favor phys-
ical solutions that result in competing users sharing scarce water
resources.
224
However, because the state currently exercises no regulatory
power over groundwater use of public land,225 the federal government
should assert its rights under California law to appropriate ground-
221. Wells converted after FLPMA are not reserved. See supra note 65. However, the
federal government may acquire appropriative rights under applicable state law. See Sup-
plement to Solicitor Opinion No. M-36914, 88 Interior Dec. 253, 255 (1981).
222. Determining priorities between the three categories of users requires an analysis of
the six possible combinations of conflicts:
1) As between correlative-overlying users, the rule is that each has a correlative right to
a reasonable share of the water. This merely restates the traditional rule of priority between
"overlying" users. See, e.g., Katz, 141 Cal. at 135, 70 P. at 772. This situation will not arise
on public land because all groundwater rights on public land are appropriative.
2) As between appropriative-overlying users, the basic rule of prior appropriation ap-
plies: first in time, first in right.
3) Similarly, as between appropriative-nonoverlying users, the rule of prior appropria-
tion applies.
4) As between a correlative-overlying user and an appropriative-overlying user, an
analogy can be made to the riparian versus appropriator rule of priority. Priority is based
on whose right vests first. Cf. Hufman, 57 Interior Dec. at 67. Because all groundwater
rights on public land are appropriative, this conflict will arise only where an aquifer lies
beneath both public and private land.
5) As between a correlative-overlying user and an appropriative-nonoverlying user, the
policy favoring overlying use prevails. Thus, the correlative-overlying user always takes
precedence. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 926, 207 P.2d 17, 28
(1949) (stating that "[p]roper overlying use. . . is paramount, and the right of an appropria-
tor [ie., a nonoverlying user], being limited to the amount of the surplus, must yield to that
of the overlying owner in the event of a shortage")
6) As between an appropriative-overlying user and an appropriative-nonoverlying user,
the overlying user takes precedence, because of the policy favoring overlying use.
223. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 106, 1254 (West 1971).
224. See supra notes 167-69 & accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 186-88 & accompanying text.
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water for public use226 by controlling existing wells when possible and
developing new wells when feasible. Historically, federal legislation has
consistently promoted a policy of protecting and developing scarce
water resources on public land, especially in desert areas. This policy is
exemplified by the Pickett Act,227 the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of
1916,228 the Executive Order, 229 and the Well Conversion Act.230 More
recently, in FLPMA, Congress again asserted the federal policy of pro-
tecting water resources23' and encouraging public use of public land.232
In addition, legislation enacted in 1916 (1916 Act) authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to discover, develop, and protect, for the bene-
fit of the general public, streams, springs, and water holes on arid pub-
lic land.233 Significantly, though FLPMA repealed many of the public
land laws,234 the 1916 Act is still in effect and specifically applies to
groundwater.235
Congress recognized that travel in arid regions of public land, es-
pecially in the desert, can be hazardous.236 The 1916 Act sought to
minimize these hazards by authorizing the Secretary to protect and to
develop public water sources.237 The extent of Congress' concern for
protecting public water sources is reflected by the criminal sanctions in
the Act for damaging such a source.238
Thus, both state and federal policy encourages the federal govern-
ment to assert its rights to appropriate scarce water resources for public
use. Indeed, an explicit objective of the BLM water rights program is
to acquire the water rights necessary to fulfill public land management
purposes.239 In addition to the government's rights under California
law, it possesses considerable authority to regulate indirectly ground-
water extraction.
226. The federal government may acquire water rights under state law in the same ways
as a private individual. See Supplement to Solicitor Opinion M-36914, 88 Interior Dec. 253,
257 (1981).
227. See supra notes 42-51 & accompanying text.
228. Id.
229. See supra notes 52-58 & accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 59-67 & accompanying text.
231. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1982).
232. Id.
233. 43 U.S.C. §§ 361-363 (1982).
234. See Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 705, 90 Stat. 2786, 2792-93 (1976).
235. 43 U.S.C. § 361 authorizes the Secretary to provide "appliances by which water
may be brought to the earth's surface at said water holes." Water below the earth's surface
is ground water. See supra note 7.
236. See S. RaP. No. 9, 64th Cong., Ist Sess (1915); see also 53 CONG. REC. 11,699 (1915)
(statements of Sen. Raker).
237. Id.
238. See 43 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
239. See BLM MANUAL, supra note 96, at § 7250.02(D).
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Indirect Federal Regulation of Groundwater Extraction on
Public Land
In addition to its powers to control reserved wells and to appropri-
ate water under state law, the federal government, through the statutes
enabling it to regulate the structures associated with groundwater ex-
traction and diversion, has substantial power to regulate indirectly
groundwater use on public land.240 This section explores all of the in-
direct means of controlling groundwater extraction on public land. For
example, under the Taylor Grazing Act241 the use and development of
water wells for livestock grazing is regulated. The development of
water wells for mining operations is subject to federal regulation under
FLPMA.2 42 Finally, when groundwater is diverted across public land,
the federal government has broad powers to regulate or to prohibit the
diversion.2 43
Public land has long been used for livestock grazing,244 an activity
regulated through a permit system pursuant to the Taylor Grazing
Act.245 The Act was intended to provide the BLM with the power nec-
essary to protect water supplies246 and to regulate the development of
water holes.247
The Taylor Grazing Act does not affect state water rights law.248
However, it does allow the BLM to regulate water well use and devel-
opment in two ways. First, the BLM may regulate access to existing
water wells on public land used for grazing purposes.249 Second, it may
regulate the construction of the shaft and appliances250 necessary for
240. Some statutes and regulations expressly mention water wells. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C.
§ 315(c) (1982). While other statutes and regulations do not expressly mention water wells,
the statutory language implies regulation of these wells.
241. See infra notes 244-55 & accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 256-83 & accompanying text.
243. See supra note 6 & accompanying text.
244. CDCA PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 17.
245. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1982).
246. See 78 CoNG. Rac. 6347-48 (1934) (statement of Rep. DeRouen).
247. Id. at 6348.
248. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1982) provides:
[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed or administered in any way to di-
minish or impair any right to the possession and use of water for mining, agricul-
ture, manufacture, or other purposes which has heretofore vested or accrued under
existing law validly affecting the public lands or which may be hereafter initiated
or acquired and maintained in accordance with such law.
249. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).
250. See V. CHOW, supra note 7, at 13-28. Chow explains that water wells are separated
into two categories: shallow wells and deep wells. Shallow wells are generally less than 50
feet deep, and are constructed by digging, driving, or jetting. Dug wells, commonly used for
individual domestic supplies, are often constructed by hand. Bored wells are constructed by
augers driven by power or by hand. Driven wells are created by driving a series of lengths
of pipe into the ground. Jetted wells are constructed by a jet of water directed down into the
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developing a water well.251
The Act requires that a permit be obtained to develop water wells
on grazing land.252 The purpose of the permit system is to assure that
any system for providing water253 is constructed and used consistent
with multiple use management. 254 The permit must specify design,
construction, and maintenance criteria.25 5 This system thus allows the
BLM to regulate well use and development to insure that management
goals are met.
Mining, a well-established use of public land,2 56 often requires
water.257 Despite the property interest that mining claimants have in
the land under claim and the importance of water to their mining oper-
ation, they acquire no water rights under federal law.258
For example, in Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co.,259 the
BLM attempted to invalidate several mining claims located on public
land in Nevada by asserting that no "valuable mineral" had been dis-
covered on the claims as required for valid location under federal
law.2 60 The claimant was using the land for a sand and gravel opera-
tion.261 Sand and gravel is expressly excluded from the statutory defi-
nition of "valuable minerals. ' 262 One of the claims, however, had a
well on it which was used in processing the sand and gravel. 263 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that water in the well constituted a
valuable mineral under federal mining law.264 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that water is not a valuable mineral subject to mining
claim location.265
The Court, while conceding that water is indeed a mineral in the
earth. Deep wells of high capacity for industrial, irrigation, or municipal use are constructed
by drilling. During or after the construction of either deep or shallow wells, the wells are
usually lined with casings made of concrete, metal or tile. Id
251. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1982).
252. Id.
253. 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-.2 (1983).
254. Id. § 4120.6-. 1(a).
255. Id. § 4120.6-.4.
256. See CDCA PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 23.
257. See, e.g., Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604 (1978).
258. Title, however, remains in the federal government. Best v. Humboldt Placer Min-
ing Co., 371 U.S. 334, 335 (1963); Freese v. United States, 639 F.2d 754, 755 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
259. 436 U.S. 604 (1978).
260. "Location" is the process by which a claimant acquires a property interest. A claim
is not located until a statutorily or judicially designated valuable mineral is found. See
Andrus, 436 U.S. at 606; see also 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1982).
261. Andrus, 436 U.S. at 606.
262. Id See also 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1982).
263. Andrus, 436 U.S. at 606.
264. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co. v. Andrus, 553 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1977).
265. Andrus, 436 U.S. at 610.
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broad sense of the word and that it is valuable,266 held that, as used by
Congress, the word "mineral" has a narrower meaning.267 The Court
reasoned that the Acts of 1866 and 1870 showed that Congress did not
consider water to be a locatable mineral.268 The Court concluded that
mining claimants must acquire water rights pursuant to state law.269
Thus, a claimant may not circumvent state water law merely by filing a
mining claim, but must, under California law, acquire the right to use
groundwater on public land by appropriation.270
Mining operations on public land are regulated under FLPMA.271
Regulations promulgated under FLPMA divide mining claims into two
categories: claims located on land under wilderness review,272 and
claims located on other public land.273 Both sets of regulations apply
to the development of water wells on public land in California.
The regulations for mining claims on land under wilderness re-
view274 require that a plan of operations be filed for the construction of
any structure on public land,275 including construction of a well by a
miner.276 The government may impose terms and conditions on well
development, or prohibit development if necessary to prevent impair-
ment of wilderness suitability.277
The regulations for mining claims on other public land require all
mine operators within the California Desert Conservation Area 278 to
submit plans describing their operation,279 including water well devel-
opment.280 The government may regulate the development to prevent
266. Id.
267. Id. at 614.
268. Id at 611-14.
269. Id at 615-16.
270. See supra notes 196-222 & accompanying text.
271. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1732, 1733, 1781, 1782 (1982).
272. 43 C.F.R. § 3802 (1983).
273. Id. § 3809.
274. Id § 3802. An area under wilderness review, a Wilderness Study Area, is defined
as a roadless area of 5,000 or more acres of public land that the BLM has found possesses
characteristics giving it the potential to be included in the National Wilderness Preservation
System. Id. § 3802.0-.5(c).
275. Id § 3802.1-.1(e). The plan must describe the nature and location of the well. Id
§ 3802.1-.4(a)(3).
276. Developing a well often involves constructing a substantial structure. See supra
note 250.
277. 43 C.F.R. § 3802.1-.5 (1983).
278. Id. § 3809.1-.4(b)(1). This area includes approximately four-fifths of the public
land in California. See supra note 5.
279. Id. § 3809.1-.5(c)(4).
280. The term "operations" includes as all work, facilities and functions in connection
with mining and all uses incident thereto. Id. § 3809.0-.5(f). Well development falls within
this broad definition.
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"unnecessary and undue degradation" of the affected land.28'
The Surface Management and Multiple Use Act of 1955 282 allows
public access to surface resources on mining claims located after
1955.283 Thus, the federal government may also ensure public access to
an existing well on a mining claim located after 1955.
The final area of indirect federal power over groundwater extrac-
tion on public land is the BLM's regulatory power over water diver-
sion. The federal government has long asserted its power to regulate
the diversion of water across public land.284 For example, in Under-
ground Water Claims, Utah,285 the Interior Department considered
water fights associated with wells on public land that was to be used for
livestock grazing.286 It concluded that "the right to appropriate water
does not necessarily carry with it a right of way over land for the use of
such water." 287 Thus, the Department concluded that the government
could protect the use of wells on public land for governmental purposes
by refusing to grant rights of way for diversion of water.288
A more recent case illustrates how the BLM has exercised its regu-
latory power over rights of way. In Scott Hampson,28 9 the appellant
had applied for a right of way permit to run a pipe from springs on
public land to his private land.290 Because of water shortages on the
public land and the use of the springs by wildlife, the BLM denied his
application, a decision that was affirmed by the Interior Board of Land
Appeals.291
FLPMA consolidated and revised many of the statutes concerning
rights of way.292 It allows the BLM to regulate the granting of rights of
way for canals, ditches, pipelines, and other structures that store, trans-
port and distribute water.293 Thus, every type of groundwater diver-
281. Id. § 3809.1-.6. "Unnecessary or undue degradation" is defined as greater surface
disturbance than is required for customary, proficient operations. Id § 3809.0-.3(k).
282. 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-612 (1982).
283. The leading case is United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir.
1980). A mining company attempted to block public access to claims in California and
Nevada. Id at 1279. The court held that the purpose of the Act was to permit multiple use
of the land, id at 1280, and that access to water for recreational purposes was protected
under the Act, id at 1283. Although the Act does not affect rights to water, 30 U.S.C. § 612
(1982), it does allow access to water.
284. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (repealed 1976).
285. 55 Interior Dec. 378 (1935).
286. Id at 379.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 380.
289. 18 Interior Bd. Land App. 203 (1974).
290. Id.
291. Id
292. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (1982). See also 43 C.F.R. §§ 2800.0-.1 to 2807.1-.2 (1983)
(right of way regulations).
293. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1982).
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sion across public land is subject to federal regulation.
In reviewing right of way applications, the BLM must consider the
effects of the diversion.294 When granting a permit, the BLM must in-
clude terms and conditions to fulfill goals of multiple use management
of public land, minimize damage to scenic and aesthetic values, protect
fish and wildlife, and otherwise protect the interests of both the federal
government and the public. 295
Similar conditions should be imposed in rights of way granted
under earlier acts. In Grindstone Butte Project v. Keppe,296 the BLM
granted rights of way for a canal and pipelines under a pre-FLPMA
act.297 The rights of way included terms and conditions for purposes
such as protecting water sources, fish and archeological sites.298 Grind-
stone challenged the BLM's authority to impose such conditions.2 99
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the pre-FLPMA acts and
the provisions of the National Environmental Preservation Act30° man-
dated that the BLM impose conditions to protect the environment.30'
Rights of way granted after FLPMA are subject to similar condi-
tions.3 02 All rights of way must be regulated by the BLM so as to pro-
tect the environment. Diversion of groundwater across public land is
thus subject to strict regulation by the BLM.
Summary of Groundwater Rights on Public Land
The summary set forth below provides a comprehensive yet simple
tool for assessing groundwater rights on public land in California.30 3
I. Existing Wells
A. Wells Developed Prior to FLPMA.
1. Converted oil or gas wells:3°4 All water in the wells is
reserved by the federal government and managed by
294. Id. § 1765. See, e.g., Desert Survivors, 80 Interior Bd. Land App. 111, 118 (1984)
(Burski, J., concurring). The BLM erred in failing to consider the effects of diversion of
water by a miner from a groundwater source on public land.
295. 43 U.S.C. § 1765 (1982).
296. 638 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981).
297. Id at 101.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b), 4332 (1982).
301. Grindstone, 638 F.2d at 103.
302. Id. Rights of way granted before FLPMA are not subject to that Act, however. Id
at 101 n.2.
303. Unless indicated otherwise, this summary is consistent with the BLM MANUAL, see
supra note 96, and with federal and state laws. A form entitled "Notification of Proposed
Water Use on Public Land" must be filed with the BLM as part of any proposal for private
use of groundwater from public land. BLM MANUAL (CALIFORNIA), supra note 96, at
§ 7250.21.
304. See supra notes 35-36 & accompanying text.
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the BLM.30 5 Owners or occupants of adjacent land
have priority to purchase the water.30 6
2. Other wells:
(a) Water needed for human and animal consumption
is reserved under the Executive Order by the
federal government and managed by the BLM if
private control of the wells could lead to
monopolization of public land.307
(b) Water from wells not covered by the Executive
Order 3 8 is regulated by California law (see IV),
but federal policy favors the BLM's control to
protect public access and use.309
B. Wells Developed After FLPMA.
1. Converted oil or gas wells: 310 California law applies
(see IV).311 Because the BLM controls the wells, the
federal government has an appropriative right under
California law to the water used. 312 Owners of
adjacent land have priority to purchase the water.313
2. Other wells: California law applies314 (see IV), but
federal policy favors BLM protection of public access
and use.3
15
II. Proposed Wells
A. All wells: California law applies316 (see IV).
B. For grazing: Construction of the wells is regulated by the
BLM under the Taylor Grazing Act.3 17
C. For mining: Construction of the wells is regulated by the
305. See supra notes 59-67 & accompanying text.
306. See supra note 64 & accompanying text.
307. There is authority within the Interior Department that holds the Executive Order
did not reserve man-made water sources such as wells. See supra notes 92-96 &
accompanying text. This Note suggests that whether a pre-FLPMA well is reserved depends
upon a balancing of factors relevant to whether private control of the water source could
lead to monopolization of public land. See supra notes 97-117 & accompanying text. Under
current authority, however, a man-made water source such as a well would pass to the
United States if abandoned by the developer or the developer's successor in interest. See
supra note 93 & accompanying text.
308. See supra note 116 & accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 223-39 & accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 35-36 & accompanying text.
311. See supra note 221 & accompanying text.
312. Id
313. See supra note 64 & accompanying text.
314. See supra note 116-17 & accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 223-39 & accompanying text.
316. See supra note 116-17 & accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 244-55 & accompanying text.
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BLM under FLPMA.31 8
III. Diversion of Water Across Public Land
A. Right of Way Permit: A permit from the BLM is required
for all facilities used to divert water across public land.319
B. Regulation: Both pre-FLPMA and post-FLPMA rights of
way must be regulated by the BLM to protect the
environment. 320
IV. California Law
A. Rule of priority: Most groundwater rights on public land
are based on prior appropriation: first in time, first in
right.32' The state has no formal appropriation
procedure.322 The State Water Board must be notified,
however, of new well construction or enlargement of an
existing well.323
B. California policy: Scarce water resources should be shared
whenever possible.324 Human consumption is the preferred
use.325 All water use must be reasonable in relation to
other needs for the water and must be beneficial.3 26
Conclusion
Much of California is desert land that is owned by the federal gov-
ernment and managed by the BLM for public uses such as recreation,
livestock grazing, and mining.327 Public use of this vast area of desert
can be difficult, even hazardous, without a source of water.328 Ground-
water often provides the needed water source. 329
However, the numerous federal and state laws affecting ground-
water rights are difficult to reconcile. The groundwater in some wells
may be reserved and regulated by the federal government,330 while the
groundwater in other wells may be subject to state law.331 In addition,
numerous federal laws affect the rights to construct wells on public
318. See supra notes 257-84 & accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 292-93 & accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 294-302 & accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 196-222 & accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 186-87 & accompanying text.
323. See supra note 187.
324. See supra notes 223-24 & accompanying text.
325. Id.
326. See supra notes 165-69 & accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 1-22 & accompanying text.
328. See supra note 236 & accompanying text.
329. See supra note 6 & accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 23-117 & accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 118-222 & accompanying text.
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land332 and to divert groundwater across public land.333 This Note has
analyzed the relationship between the various laws and fashioned a
concise summary for assessing the rights in a particular case. 334
Because California does not regulate groundwater extraction on
public land,335 the BLM must fill this role. The BLM should encourage
the development of groundwater resources to facilitate public use of the
public land and to protect public use of existing weUs. 336 At the same
time, the BLM should carefully manage scarce groundwater resources
to prevent environmental damage.337 Fortunately, there is ample basis
under federal and state law for the BLM to continue in its historical
role of developing and protecting groundwater resources on public
land.338
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